This could be a side note but recently i've read some materials about British tanks deployed, the tactics used and the organisation of armoured units; it appear that the main problem was not the aparent poor quality of British tanks or the infantry/cruiser tank concept; i will refer at first to Operation 'Crusader' wich aimed to relief the Tobruk besieged garison; time and again the tanks of 7th armoured division, the desert rats, attack without infantry, artillery and air support axis positions losing many tanks in proces [the main battle tank was 15 crusader with a decent AT gun compared with the early models of panzer mk III]; this division was too tank heavy: 6 tanks regiments and only 2 motor batalions compared to the german counterparts - 2 tank batalions and 4 motorised/mechanised batalions in each panzer division.
In 1944 during Operation 'Goodwood', British armour, constrained by the terrain behind the start line, committed the same error that had characterized it in the desert. Individual tank battalions fought unsupported and in succession, rather than fighting together as part of all-arms battlegroups. Here are conflicting reports: Dempsey directed his Corps Commander (including O'Connor) to move the tanks ahead, leaving behind everything else including the infantry, engineers, artillery etc until all the tanks were across. Others blame O'Connor for this decision but the result was predictable: unsupported tank units could not easily root out dug-in towed guns, although a combined-arms team of tanks, infantry and self-propelled artillery might have had much better luck.
Only after this failure Maj.Gen. 'Pip' Roberts, commander of 11th armoured reorganised his unit in battlegroups with one tank batalion with one infantry batalion (also the guard armoured division was reorganised in the same manner - the Irish battlegoup was to lead the XXX Corps during the Operation Market Garden) and the results of this during subsequent battles and liberation of belgium proved that this was the most effectiv way to deploy tanks.
Back in the desert, a more balanced organisation, two tank regiments with 2 motor batalions per brigade (at that time the Eitgh Army had more than enought manpower and tanks to do so) with proper artilery support would have been decisive in Operation 'Crusader' or battles for Gazala line.
I apologize for possible errors regarding grammar or spelling, however English is not my native language.